ntoskrnl.exe上的BSOD（已连接到clfs.sys）（包括转储）

1

在ILOK许可证和Visual C ++ 2008和2005的安装失败后。

然后激活F11以在重新启动时从Acronis还原，将获得第一个BSOD。

BSOD随后在空闲系统中发生。

在此之前我做了什么：

  1. 已安装win7
  2. 已安装sp1
  3. 已安装的驱动程序
  4. 已安装acronis 2015
  5. 在启动时停止Windows 7中的Acronis服务。
  6. 使用f11 dos引导中的acronis备份操作系统
  7. 从F11 Dos acronis引导安全区域映像还原的操作系统
  8. 已安装FL Studio
  9. 安装VST
  10. 一位要求安装Visual C ++ 2005和2008的vst失败，出现1935错误。ILOK，和平许可证。
  11. 寻求解决错误（思想还原未正常工作）
  12. 从acronis激活了F11。
  13. 单击重新启动（第一次-BOOM-BSOD）
  14. 登录Windows，搜索Google（第二次BSOD）
  15. memtest86，5小时，通过4次，没有错误。
  16. 西部数据的wdc测试（快速扩展），均无错误。
  17. sfc / scannow-未发现完整性违规
  18. 恶意软件字节扫描-仅限小狗打开糖果警告
  19. HD Tunes扫描-没有坏道。

请有人帮忙。

Crash dump directory: C:\Windows\Minidump

Crash dumps are enabled on your computer.

On Fri 28.8.2015 12:47:27 GMT your computer crashed
crash dump file: C:\Windows\Minidump\082815-17378-01.dmp
This was probably caused by the following module: ntoskrnl.exe (nt+0x80640) 
Bugcheck code: 0xA (0x0, 0x2, 0x1, 0xFFFFF80002E753DE)
Error: IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
file path: C:\Windows\system32\ntoskrnl.exe
product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
company: Microsoft Corporation
description: NT Kernel & System
Bug check description: This indicates that Microsoft Windows or a kernel-mode driver accessed paged memory at DISPATCH_LEVEL or above.
This appears to be a typical software driver bug and is not likely to be caused by a hardware problem. 
The crash took place in the Windows kernel. Possibly this problem is caused by another driver that cannot be identified at this time. 



On Fri 28.8.2015 12:47:27 GMT your computer crashed
crash dump file: C:\Windows\memory.dmp
This was probably caused by the following module: clfs.sys (CLFS!ClfsLsnContainer+0x1E49) 
Bugcheck code: 0xA (0x0, 0x2, 0x1, 0xFFFFF80002E753DE)
Error: IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
file path: C:\Windows\system32\clfs.sys
product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
company: Microsoft Corporation
description: Common Log File System Driver
Bug check description: This indicates that Microsoft Windows or a kernel-mode driver accessed paged memory at DISPATCH_LEVEL or above.
This appears to be a typical software driver bug and is not likely to be caused by a hardware problem. 
The crash took place in a standard Microsoft module. Your system configuration may be incorrect. Possibly this problem is caused by another driver on your system that cannot be identified at this time. 



On Fri 28.8.2015 12:38:47 GMT your computer crashed
crash dump file: C:\Windows\Minidump\082815-18142-01.dmp
This was probably caused by the following module: ntoskrnl.exe (nt+0x80640) 
Bugcheck code: 0xA (0x0, 0x2, 0x1, 0xFFFFF80002E653DE)
Error: IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
file path: C:\Windows\system32\ntoskrnl.exe
product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
company: Microsoft Corporation
description: NT Kernel & System
Bug check description: This indicates that Microsoft Windows or a kernel-mode driver accessed paged memory at DISPATCH_LEVEL or above.
This appears to be a typical software driver bug and is not likely to be caused by a hardware problem. 
The crash took place in the Windows kernel. Possibly this problem is caused by another driver that cannot be identified at this time. 



On Fri 28.8.2015 12:30:21 GMT your computer crashed
crash dump file: C:\Windows\Minidump\082815-18938-01.dmp
This was probably caused by the following module: ntoskrnl.exe (nt+0x80640) 
Bugcheck code: 0xA (0x0, 0x2, 0x1, 0xFFFFF80002E663DE)
Error: IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL
file path: C:\Windows\system32\ntoskrnl.exe
product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
company: Microsoft Corporation
description: NT Kernel & System
Bug check description: This indicates that Microsoft Windows or a kernel-mode driver accessed paged memory at DISPATCH_LEVEL or above.
This appears to be a typical software driver bug and is not likely to be caused by a hardware problem. 
The crash took place in the Windows kernel. Possibly this problem is caused by another driver that cannot be identified at this time.

    *******************************************************************************
*                                                                             *
*                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *
*                                                                             *
*******************************************************************************

IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (a)
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an
interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high.  This is usually
caused by drivers using improper addresses.
If a kernel debugger is available get the stack backtrace.
Arguments:
Arg1: 0000000000000000, memory referenced
Arg2: 0000000000000002, IRQL
Arg3: 0000000000000001, bitfield :
    bit 0 : value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
    bit 3 : value 0 = not an execute operation, 1 = execute operation (only on chips which support this level of status)
Arg4: fffff80002e753de, address which referenced memory

Debugging Details:
------------------

TRIAGER: Could not open triage file : e:\dump_analysis\program\triage\modclass.ini, error 2

WRITE_ADDRESS: GetPointerFromAddress: unable to read from fffff800030c80e8
GetUlongFromAddress: unable to read from fffff800030c8198
 0000000000000000 Nonpaged pool

CURRENT_IRQL:  2

FAULTING_IP: 
nt!ExDeleteResourceLite+ce
fffff800`02e753de 488908          mov     qword ptr [rax],rcx

DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID:  WIN7_DRIVER_FAULT

BUGCHECK_STR:  0xA

PROCESS_NAME:  svchost.exe

TRAP_FRAME:  fffff88008f957d0 -- (.trap 0xfffff88008f957d0)
NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.
Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.
rax=0000000000000000 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000000
rdx=0000000000000001 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=fffff80002e753de rsp=fffff88008f95960 rbp=fffff8a00013f700
 r8=fffffa8007318010  r9=fffff880009e8180 r10=fffffa8006d36c70
r11=fffffa80075c3ae0 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
nt!ExDeleteResourceLite+0xce:
fffff800`02e753de 488908          mov     qword ptr [rax],rcx ds:00000000`00000000=????????????????
Resetting default scope

LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER:  from fffff80002e96be9 to fffff80002e97640

STACK_TEXT:  
fffff880`08f95688 fffff800`02e96be9 : 00000000`0000000a 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000001 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`08f95690 fffff800`02e95860 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffff880`08f95958 fffffa80`07caf5c8 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`08f957d0 fffff800`02e753de : fffff8a0`0013f750 fffff8a0`0013f6e0 fffffa80`07d9eda8 fffff8a0`0013f698 : nt!KiPageFault+0x260
fffff880`08f95960 fffff880`00c68e2d : 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`0013f700 fffffa80`07caf530 00000000`00000001 : nt!ExDeleteResourceLite+0xce
fffff880`08f959c0 fffff880`00c94a68 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`08f95a38 fffffa80`07d9ecb0 fffff880`00c693c3 : CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::`scalar deleting destructor'+0xcd
fffff880`08f95a00 fffff880`00c68157 : fffffa80`07caf2c0 00000000`0000000b fffffa80`07caf2c0 fffff880`00c69241 : CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::Release+0x20
fffff880`08f95a30 fffff880`00c67934 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`07caf2c0 fffffa80`07d9ecb0 : CLFS!CClfsRequest::`scalar deleting destructor'+0x123
fffff880`08f95a60 fffff880`00cb0d50 : 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`0013f700 00000000`00000001 fffff8a0`03865000 : CLFS!CClfsRequest::Release+0x20
fffff880`08f95a90 fffff880`00ca95be : fffffa80`07caf690 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`003c7000 fffff800`00000400 : CLFS!ClfsReserveAndAppendLogInternal+0x3c4
fffff880`08f95ba0 fffff880`00ca7d13 : fffff8a0`0013f700 fffff8a0`000a0c00 fffff8a0`00000006 00000000`00000008 : CLFS!CClfsKernelMarshallingContext::AppendWriteBlockToFlushQueue+0x1c2
fffff880`08f95ca0 fffff880`00cb088f : fffff8a0`0013f700 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000007 00000000`00000008 : CLFS!CClfsKernelMarshallingContext::ReserveAndAppendLog+0x4d7
fffff880`08f95d80 fffff800`03126806 : ffffffff`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`06f3d340 00000000`00000001 : CLFS!ClfsReserveAndAppendLogAligned+0x2ab
fffff880`08f95e10 fffff800`03124398 : 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`000a0cf0 fffffa80`00000007 fffff880`08f96008 : nt!TmpWriteLog+0x176
fffff880`08f95ec0 fffff800`0311d22a : 00000000`c0190013 fffffa80`06f3d340 fffffa80`075a7c30 fffffa80`075a7cf8 : nt!TmpLogTransaction+0x810
fffff880`08f96080 fffff800`031204c4 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`c0190013 fffffa80`075a7c30 fffffa80`075a7c00 : nt!TmpTxActionDoCommit+0xda
fffff880`08f960e0 fffff800`031254d7 : fffffa80`075a7c30 fffffa80`06f3d340 00000000`00000004 00000000`00000000 : nt!TmCommitEnlistment+0x100
fffff880`08f96120 fffff800`031258c2 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000003 00000000`00000000 : nt!TmpInternalCrmNotification+0x15b
fffff880`08f961a0 fffff800`03123acd : 00000000`00000003 fffffa80`06f3d340 fffff800`02fd21d0 00000000`00000000 : nt!TmpSetNotificationResourceManager+0xf2
fffff880`08f96220 fffff800`0311d2c5 : 00000000`00000005 00000000`00000004 fffffa80`072ab101 fffffa80`072ab1c0 : nt!TmpNotifyAllEnlistmentsTransaction+0x19d
fffff880`08f962a0 fffff800`031203bc : fffffa80`072ab1c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`072ab1c0 : nt!TmpTxActionDoCommit+0x175
fffff880`08f96300 fffff800`03126e6d : fffffa80`075b71e0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`03536300 : nt!TmpTxActionDoPrepareComplete+0xa0
fffff880`08f96350 fffff800`031250fa : fffffa80`075b71e0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!TmpProcessNotificationResponse+0x12d
fffff880`08f963c0 fffff800`0311f34d : 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`03536370 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 : nt!TmPrepareComplete+0x5e
fffff880`08f96420 fffff800`031258c2 : fffff880`08f96700 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000002 fffffa80`072ab288 : nt!CmKtmNotification+0x461
fffff880`08f964f0 fffff800`03123acd : 00000000`00000002 fffffa80`075b71e0 fffff800`02fd21d0 fffff8a0`03536370 : nt!TmpSetNotificationResourceManager+0xf2
fffff880`08f96570 fffff800`03122268 : 00000000`00000002 fffff880`00000002 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`072ab1c0 : nt!TmpNotifyAllEnlistmentsTransaction+0x19d
fffff880`08f965f0 fffff800`0311dd6f : fffffa80`072ab1c0 fffff880`08f96734 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`072ab1c0 : nt!TmpTxActionDoPrepare+0x84
fffff880`08f96630 fffff800`03126e6d : fffffa80`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!TmpTxActionDoPrePrepareComplete+0x67
fffff880`08f96680 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!TmpProcessNotificationResponse+0x12d


STACK_COMMAND:  kb

FOLLOWUP_IP: 
CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::`scalar deleting destructor'+cd
fffff880`00c68e2d ff05a96b0100    inc     dword ptr [CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::m_laList+0x1c (fffff880`00c7f9dc)]

SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX:  4

SYMBOL_NAME:  CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::`scalar deleting destructor'+cd

FOLLOWUP_NAME:  MachineOwner

MODULE_NAME: CLFS

IMAGE_NAME:  CLFS.SYS

DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP:  4a5bc11d

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  X64_0xA_CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::_scalar_deleting_destructor_+cd

BUCKET_ID:  X64_0xA_CLFS!CClfsLogCcb::_scalar_deleting_destructor_+cd

Followup: MachineOwner
windows-7  bsod 
— user3918164
source
运行chkdsk / r / f来检测并修复NTFS文件系统损坏。
— magicandre1981
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